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COUP DE GRACE FOR PERSONAL 
INJURY TORTS? 
Alfred F. Conard* 
DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW: NEW COMPENSA-
TION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS AND BUSINESS. By 
Stephen D. Sugarman, with a foreword by Jeffrey O'Connell. New 
York: Quorum Books. 1989. Pp. xviii, 224. $49.95. 
For more than a century, personal injury tort law has been suffer-
ing amputations by workers' compensation and automobile no-fault 
regimes, eclipses by Social Security and employee benefits, and en-
chainment by limitations on the size of awards. Now Stephen 
Sugarman proposes to put the poor beast out of its misery, and to 
substitute a comprehensive system of compensation and deterrence 
that would operate largely without regard to fault and even without 
regard to the cause of need. 1 
It is a brave plan and a mature one. Sugarman leaves no stone 
unthrown against tort suits for personal injury and no victim forgotten 
in his scheme for compensation. He recognizes the unreadiness of 
public opinion for his final solution, and proposes a more plausible 
"first step" to move society gradually toward its ideal destination. 
I. THE PATHOLOGY OF TORT SUITS 
Viewing the tort system in terms of the merits that its defenders 
claim for it, Sugarman finds it sick. It provides no compensation at all 
for accident victims who cannot tie their injuries to a tortfeasor who is 
either financially responsible or adequately insured. 2 When it does 
* Henry M. Butzel Professor Emeritus, University of Michigan Law School. A.B. 1932, 
Grinnell College; LL.B. 1936, University of Pennsylvania; J.S.D. 1942, Columbia University; 
LL.D. 1971, Grinnell College. - Ed. The author acknowledges the helpful critiques of Robert 
H. Abrams, James Krier, Mathias Reimann, and Kent Syverud, and the invaluable research 
assistance of Lois Gianneschi. 
1. The plans outlined in the work reviewed were earlier set forth in Sugarman, Serious Tort 
Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795 (1987), and were the subject of comment in the follow-
ing articles in the same issue: Gray, On Sugarman on Tort-Chopping, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
851 (1987); Little, Up with Torts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 861 (1987); Berkowitz, How Serious is 
Sugarman's ''Serious Tort Law Reform"?, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 877 (1987); Snyder, Serious 
Tort Reform Isn't: A Critique of Professor Sugarman's ''Serious Tort Law Reform'~ 24 SAN DI-
EGO L. REV. 893 (1987); Cortese & Riemer, De.fining the Agenda for Serious Tort Reform, 24 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 903 (1987); O'Connell & Tenser, North America's Most Ambitious No-Fault 
Law: Quebec's Auto Insurance Act, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 929 (1987); Trebilcock, The Social 
Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American Tort Law: A Canadian Perspective on 
the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 929 (1987). 
2. P. 37. Sugarman cites a British survey which found that only 12% of accident victims 
1557 
1558 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1557 
compensate, it is likely to award huge amounts for pain and suffering3 
which would be better spent on the basic needs of the uncompensated. 
The tort system fails also, in Sugarman's eyes, to punish or deter 
injurers. Most tortfeasors are covered by liability insurance, so that 
they pay no more when they cause injuries than when they do not. 
The threat of increased premiums or of cancellation is remote.4 
In Sugarman's analysis, the tort system also incurs prohibitive 
costs. It consumes vast human work hours in the litigation and insur-
ance industries, whose costs surpass the benefits delivered to injury 
victims. 5 On occasion, it poisons the system of justice by providing 
rewards for fabricated or exaggerated claims. 6 
Sugarman's dissatisfaction is not confined to the tort system's fail-
ure to achieve its avowed objectives. He is a professor not only of 
torts, but also of social and welfare legislation. From the welfare per-
spective, he is appalled by the lack of compensation for victims of acci-
dents, diseases, and disabilities who cannot ascribe their misery to the 
fault of anyone else, but who are just as deserving as are the victims of 
reckless drivers (p. 37). 
Sugarman is equally concerned with the plight of those who are in 
need because they are unemployed. His major premise is encapsulated 
in his broad assertion: "In general, all Americans should be ensured 
reasonable levels of income for periods of nonwork and should have 
generous protection against the risk they will incur medical and 'Other 
expenses" (pp. 134-35). 
Viewing fault as irrelevant to the appropriateness of compensatlon, 
Sugarman proposes that society should stop wasting its resources on 
proving its presence or absence as a condition of compensating need 
(pp. 127-29). He has examined carefully the numerous varieties of no-
fault plans, 7 and finds that they provide no relief for the victims of 
misfortune who cannot cite a "cause" of their need. Even the victims 
who can prove a cause undergo the delay and expense required to 
prove that a particular company or individual or product did the 
damage. 
obtained tort recovery, and an American author's estimate that one in 25 malpractice victims 
recovers. For additional detail, he refers the reader to R. KEETON & J, O'CONNELL, BASIC 
PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 34-69 (1965). 
3. P. 39. Sugarman cites GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION 27 (1987) and various law review authors. 
4. Pp. 12-16. Sugarman makes these assertions without citing specific data. He recognizes 
that the assertions do not apply to large enterprises that self-insure, but he does not explain why 
tort law is ineffective in producing safety practices in these enterprises. 
5. P. 40. Sugarman cites J. KAKALIK & N. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN 
TORT LITIGATION (1986), and various commentators. 
6. Pp. 20-21. Sugarman cites no authority for this statement. 
7. Pp. 101-23. See especially p. 110, where Sugarman refers to proposals of Marc Franklin, 
Richard Pierce, Roger Henderson, Eli Bemzweig, and Geoffrey Palmer (author of the New Zea-
land plan). 
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II. THE PRESCRIPTIONS 
Sugarman prescribes two regimes of treatment for the sickness of 
personal injury tort law. One of them is his ultimate plan, which he 
calls a "Comprehensive Compensation Strategy" (pp. 127-65) and 
which I will abbreviate as "CCS." Recognizing that CCS is some de-
cades ahead of public opinion, he proposes another package for imme-
diate adoption, which he calls a "Substantial First Step" (pp. 167-200) 
and which I will call "SFS." 
1. The Comprehensive Compensation Strategy (CCS) 
CCS would "do away with personal injury law" by sweeping it into 
a pair of comprehensive systems that would consolidate a basket of 
other programs such as workers' compensation, unemployment com-
pensation, and Old Age, Survivors' and Disability Insurance (OASDI, 
popularly known as "social security"). But it would be broader than 
all of them put together. Under CCS, people who would otherwise 
lack needed income or health care would receive it without regard to 
the cause of their need. Occasions for compensation would include 
not merely accidents, illnesses, and lay-offs, but any other cause of 
need, including youth, old age, or incompetence (pp. 134-43). In con-
trast to no-fault, it might be called "no-cause" insurance. 
Compensation would be paid from two sources. Temporary needs 
of wage earners and their families would be paid by their employers. 
Long-term needs would be met by an expanded social security system 
(pp. 143-48), which I will call "XSSS" to distinguish it from existing 
programs like OASDI, Unemployment Insurance, and Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC). 
Although CCS would compensate need regardless of its cause, the 
levels of compensation would vary in relation to the levels of income 
that the victims had earned before their need arose. As under work-
ers' compensation, wage substitution would be set at some proportion 
of the prior wage, with some sort of cap. 8 This arrangement would 
lead to considerable variations in the level of support. N oneamers 
would be supported at a lower level, which would be uniform with a 
few exceptions. 9 
For deterring risky activities, Sugarman would tum from tort law 
to governmental regulatory agencies like the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, and the National Highway Traffic 
8. Pp. 136-41. Sugarman would cap wage replacement at twice the national average wage. 
P. 138. 
9. A surprising possible exception would embrace victims of total disability who, at the onset 
of their disability, were students in higher education. Since their expectations of future income 
would be higher than the average, their disability benefits might be set above the minimum. P. 
139. 
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Safety Administration, which would be given increased powers to in-
vestigate, regulate, and penalize violators (pp. 156-59). He suggests 
rather tentatively that tort suits for punitive damages on account of 
intentional wrongs might be preserved, although he places no reliance 
on them to promote safety practices (pp. 160-62). 
Obviously, CCS goes far beyond any of the no-fault proposals that 
led the attack on tort law in the 1970s. It even goes beyond the New 
Zealand Compensation Act of 1972,10 which eliminated tort suits for 
personal injury. The New Zealand law awarded compensation to em-
ployed persons and victims of automobile accidents, but gave no bene-
fits to unemployed persons who were injured by means other than 
automobiles. Furthermore, its benefits were not mingled with those of 
the social security system; accident compensation and social security 
were separate systems.11 
The closest ancestor of CCS is probably a set of recommendations 
advanced in 1984 by a group of social scientists at Oxford University, 
who proposed a unified program of compensation for illness and in-
jury.12 But CCS is more comprehensive than the Oxford plan in that 
it would compensate unemployment from causes other than illness 
and injury, and includes provisions for injury prevention that are not 
mentioned in the Oxford group's proposals. 
2. The Substantial First Step (SFS) 
Sugarman's "Substantial First Step," contains both take-aways and 
give-aways (pp. 167-200). The most substantial take-away would be 
the reversal of the traditional "collateral source rule," which requires 
that damages be awarded without regard to most of the benefits that 
the injury victim may receive under workers' compensation, sick leave, 
Social Security, or other sources. 13 Under SFS, most collateral source 
compensation would be deducted from damages recoverable in tort 
suits.14 
10. 'Accident Compensation Law 1972, N.Z. Stat. No. 43 (1972). 
11. Palmer, Compensation for Personal Injury: A Requiem for the Common Law in New 
Zealand, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 17 (1973). 
12. D. HARRIS, M. MACLEAN, H. GENN, S. LLOYD-BOSTOCK, P. FENN, P. CORFIELD & Y. 
BRIITAN, CoMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND INJURY (1984). The work was 
sponsored by the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Wolfson College, Oxford University. 
13. A 1986 article on collateral sources in automobile injuries listed 14 states that had re-
versed the collateral source rule in medical malpractice cases, and an Alabama statute providing 
for deduction, in products liability cases, of reimbursed medical expenses. Note, California's 
Collateral Source Rule and Plaintiff's Receipt of Uninsured Motorist Benefits, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 
667, 678-79 nn.86, 88 (1986). 
In 1986, Florida and Michigan adopted laws reversing the collateral source rule in nil per-
sonal injury cases. FLA. ST. ANN. § 768.76; Mich. Pub. L. 178, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 600.6303 (West 1987). 
14. Pp. 174-76. Sugarman does not describe the procedures by which the collateral benefits 
would be deducted, but seems to assume that they would be estimated and deducted in the same 
way that losses are estimated and awarded. He says that "the torts process, whether in settle-
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Take-aways under SFS would also include limits on awards for 
psychic loss and punitive damages. Nothing would be paid for the 
pain and suffering sustained during the first six months of a victim's 
disability, and a monetary cap of $150,000 would be imposed on re-
coveries for long-term pain (pp. 176-80). Punitive damages would be 
awarded only by the judge, rather than by a jury (pp. 181-83). 
A few crumbs of satisfaction would be offered to tort claimants 
and their lawyers. First, contributory negligence would no longer bar 
or diminish recovery (p. 186). Second, attorneys' fees would be rou-
tinely awarded to successful claimants (pp. 183-86). These consola-
tions would apply only to the remnants of recoverable damage that 
would remain after deduction of collateral sources and curtailment of 
psychic and punitive awards. 
The principal give-away that SFS would offer to injury victims is 
an expansion of the benefits that most employers already grant to em-
ployees and their families pursuant to law or contract (pp. 169-74). In 
cases of temporary disability, employees would be paid a fraction (typ-
ically two thirds) of their basic wage after a brief waiting period (typi-
cally one week). They would receive these benefits for disabilities of 
all kinds, including those having no relation to their jobs. Employers 
would also provide sick leave at full pay, without a waiting period, in 
some proportion to the number of days worked. 
These provisions would be compulsory for all employers. 
Sugarman thinks they would add little to the costs of benefits now 
provided by major employers voluntarily or pursuant to :state laws and 
union contracts (p. 189). 
When the disability continues beyond a short term (typically six 
months), the employers' payments would be replaced by payments 
under the existing system of Old Age, Survivors' and Disability Insur-
ance (p. 171). 
Employers would also be encouraged, although not compelled, to 
provide health insurance to employees and their families. An incen-
tive to provide these benefits, which are already widespread, would be 
supplied by relieving employers who provide them from medical bene-
fit liabilities under workers' compensation (p. 173). 
III. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Sugarman's proposals seem revolutionary when compared with ex-
isting tort law, but they are not so radical when viewed against legisla-
ments or through formal adjudication, will have to estimate the future value of basic social insur-
ance and employee benefits . . . . But, because estimating the victims' gross future losses is itself 
very problematic, only reasonable estimates are required." P. 175. 
In contrast, the Michigan statute specifies that collateral sources should be determined and 
deducted by the judge without jury participation. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.6303 (West 
1987). 
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tion, scholarship, and reform proposals affecting personal injury law 
over the past century. 
1. Work Injuries 
One hundred years ago, a major preoccupation of tort lawyers 
comprised claims of injured workers against their employers. 15 "As-
sumption of risk" and the "fellow-servant rule" were the bread and 
butter of defense advocates. These aspects of the common law of tort 
were gradually excised by employers' liability laws, which appeared as 
early as 185516 and reached the major industrial states by the first dec-
ade of the twentieth century.17 
The employers' liability laws were only the precursors of deeper 
invasions. In most industries, tort actions by employees against em-
ployers were categorically displaced in the first quarter of the twenti-
eth century by workers' compensation acts. These laws replaced the 
concept of fault with the concept of cause; employees were compen-
sated for injuries caused by the employment regardless of fault. The 
principal elements of compensation were a prescribed fraction of the 
employee's prior wage, and virtually unlimited costs of medical treat-
ment for covered injuries. 1s 
The modified tort system that had survived for work injuries in the 
railroad industry19 was similarly studied by the Railroad Retirement 
Board in the 1930s and 1940s, and found inferior to a workers' com-
pensation regime. 2° Congress did not, however, act on this finding. 
2. Automobile Injuries 
By the late 1920s, automobile accidents had superseded work acci-
dents as the flagship of tort law. Some thoughtful academics and ju-
rists became concerned by the tort system's capricious under- and 
over-compensation of injuries. In 1932, a consortium of distinguished 
lawyers, judges, and professors produced a study of automobile acci-
dent compensation that concluded by proposing a system of compen-
sation for automobile injuries modeled on workers' compensation.21 
But no legislature adopted the committee's proposal. 
15. In T. SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (4th ed. 1888), 115 of the 561 
pages of text were devoted to "Liability of Masters to Servants." The introduction to the fifth 
edition in 1898 contained a spirited editorial denunciation of the fellow-servant rule. T. 
SHEARMAN & A. REDFIELD, LAW OF NEGLIGENCE vi-vii (5th ed. 1898). 
16. For details, see W. DODD, THE ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 13 
(1936). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 27-52. 
19. Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982). 
20. U.S. RAILROAD RETIREMENT BOARD, WORK INJURIES IN THE RAILROAD INDUSTRY, 
1938-1940 (1947). 
21. REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE TO STUDY COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE Acc1-
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frn the '1950s and 1960s, a series of studies at Temple University,22 
the University of Pennsylvania,23 and the University of Michigan24 
again highlighted defects of the fault-based tort regime in relation to 
autpmobile accidents. These studies were followed and confirmed by a 
na~onwide study sponsored by the federal Department of Transporta-
tion. 25 At the same time, scholars at Columbia University and the 
University of Chicago were studying sources of court congestion, to 
which accident suits· were a major contributor. 26 
"Of the many reform proposals emanating from these studies, the 
most influential was the "Basic Protection" plan of Robert Keeton 
and Jeffrey O'Connell,27 which became. the· template for the conclu-
sions of the Secretary of Transportation and for a flock -0f bills in state 
legislatures. It led to the adoption during the 1970s of "no-fault" au-
tomobile injury laws in sixteen states.28 
~ , .. ' 
DENTS (1932) [hereinafter ACCIDENT CoMPENSATION REPORT]. The compensation plan ap-
~ at pages 211-16. , 
The study was authorized and the report issued by a committee "formed by voluntary associ-
ation." Id. at 2. Its 14.members included academics-(Charles E. Clark and Walter F. Dodd of 
Y alC, J.P. Chamberlain of Columbia, and William Draper Lewis of Pennsylvania and the Ameri-
can -Law Institute), public officials (Arthur A. Ballantine, Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treas-
ury,'Ogden L.'Mills, Undersecretary of the U.S. Treasury, and William A. Schnader, Attorney 
General of Pennsylvania), incumbent or former judges (Victor J. Dowling of the New York 
Appellate Division, Robert S. Marx of the Cincinnati Superior Court, Bernard L. Shientag of the 
New York Supreme Court, and Horace Stem of the Philadelphia Common Pleas), and practicing 
lawyers (Miles F. Dawson and Henry W. Taft of New York, and Henry S. Drinker, Jr. of Phila-
delphia). See id. at 15 n. 2. 
The study was conducted primarily in Philadelphia under the direction of a Philadelphia 
lawyer, Shippen Lewis, but under the sponsorship of the Columbia University Council for Re-
search in the Social Sciences. See id. at 8-9. 
22. Adams, A Survey of Economic-Financial Consequences of Personal Injuries Resulting 
From Automobile Accidents in the City of Philadelphia, 1953, 7-3 EcoN. & Bus. BULL. 5 (Temple 
U.~ Mar. 1955); A Comparative Analysis of Costs of Insuring Against Losses Due to Automobile 
Accidents, 12-3 EcoN. & Bus. BULL. 7 (Temple U., Mar. 1960), at 1. 
23. Morris & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 913 
(1962);, 
24. A. CoNARD, J. MORGAN, R. PRATT, JR., C. VOLTZ & R. BOMBAUGH, AUTOMOBILE 
ACCIDENT Cosrs AND PAYMENTS (1964). 
25. J. VOLPE, MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH LoSSES AND THEIR COMPENSATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES (1971). This was the summation of the Department of Transportation's "Auto-
mobile Insurance and Compensation Study," reported in a series of paperbound pamphlets. 
26. Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes and Proposed Remedies, in H. JONES, THE 
CoURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW 29 (1965); Rosenberg & Chaning, Auditors in Massachu-
settsasAntidotesfor Delayed Civil Courts, 110 u. PA. L. REV. 27 (1961); H. ZEISEL, H. KALVEN 
& B. BUCHHOLZ, DELAY IN THE COURT (1959). 
27. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, supra note 2. 
28. For tabulations, see 4 J. HAMMITT, R. HOUCHENS, s. POLIN & J. ROLPH, AUTOMOBILE 
ACCIDENT COMPENSATION: STATE RULES viii, 13 (1985) [hereinafter J. HAMMITT]; 1 ALL-
INDUSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY CoMMITTEE, AUTOMOBILE INJURIES AND THEIR COMPEN-
SATION IN THE UNITED STATES 78 (1979) [hereinafter ALL-INDUSTRY COMMITTEE STUDY]. 
The All-Industry Research Advisory Committee describes itself as "formed by the property-
casualty industry." It lists three insurance company associations and three representatives of 
"independents" as its members. Id. at iii. 
In addition to the 16 states that the All-Industry Committee Study lists as "no-fault," it lists 
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The no-fault automobile insurance laws had two basic elements. 
First, they required that every automobile insurance policy should 
compensate victims of accidents involving the insured automobile re-
gardless of fault; this meant that injured drivers and passengers could 
recover compensation for their injuries from the insurer of the car in 
which they were riding. Second, these laws curtailed the right of vic-
tims to sue anyone else for causing their injuries. 
For major injuries (variously defined), victims could sue tortfeasors 
essentially as under common law. The amount of payments under the 
surviving zone of tort law proved to exceed substantially the amount 
paid under no-fault. Even in Michigan, commonly called the "purest" 
of the no-fault states, compensation for automobile injuries under the 
tort system substantially exceeded compensation under no-fault law.29 
The no-fault movement stalled in the 1980s, and there have been no 
further conversions. 3o 
3. Social Welfare Programs 
While personal injury tort law continued to nourish lawyers and 
underwriters and congest judicial dockets, more direct means of reliev-
ing the distress of needy individuals, including injury victims, grew up 
alongside it. The destitution of injury victims, which had been high-
lighted by the Columbia study of 1932,31 had been greatly alleviated 
by the creation and subsequent expansions of the Social Security sys-
tem to provide compensation for disability and death, and by sick 
leave and health insurance supplied by employers voluntarily or under 
labor contracts. By 1984, compensation for automobile accident vic-
tims under tort law was less than ten percent of the compensation paid 
to the victims of loss under the panoply of social and private loss-
shifting systems. 32 · 
eight "add-on" states, which provide some no-fault benefits to injury victims without modifying 
their rights under tort law. ALL-INDUSTRY COMMITI'EE STUDY, supra, at 78. 
29. Id. at 83 (reporting that in 1977 41.1 % of total insurance payments were made under the 
no-fault regime and 53.4% under the tort regime). 
30. J. O'CONNELL & C.B. KELLY, THE BLAME GAME 116 (1987). 
31. ACCIDENT COMPENSATION REPORT, supra note 21, at 65. 
32. See O'Connell & Guinivan, An I"ational Combination: The Relative Expansion of Lia-
bility Insurance and Contraction of Loss Insurance, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 757, 759 (1988); O'Connell 
& Barker, Compensation for Injury and Illness: An Update of the Conard·Morgan Tabulations, 
47 OHIO ST. L.J. 913, 924, 926 (1986). These articles report the tort proportion of total compen-
sation at 7.9% in 1960, 8.8% in 1982, and 9.8% in 1984. 
The authors make a point of the apparent increase of the tort proportion, but the significance 
of this aspect of the data is unclear. The measure of the "tort" sector used in these articles 
includes payments under no-fault plans, presumably to provide comparability with earlier years 
in which no-fault plans did not exist. If the no·fault payments were subtracted, however, and 
allowance were made for errors in the statistics, the apparent shift in proportions might be 
insignificant. 
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4. Curtailing Payouts 
In the late 1970s and the 1980s, attacks on personal injury tort law 
took a new tack, inspired not by a concern for compensation, but by a 
concern with the spiraling costs of liability insurance. 33 Every state 
adopted at least one statute limiting in some way awards of compensa-
tion for personal injuries. 34 The movement led the American Bar As-
sociation in 1979 to appoint a Special Committee on the Tort Liability 
System, which reported, predictably, that no substantial changes were 
needed.35 
In 1986, U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese appointed a group to 
study the "insurance crisis."36 The group found no structural fault in 
the tort system, but reported that the magnitude of awards had be-
come unreasonable. Its principal recommendations were to eliminate 
joint-and-several liability, cap noneconomic damages at $100,000, tum 
large lump-sum damages into periodic payments, limit contingent fees, 
and stimulate alternative dispute resolution. 37 
5. The Augury 
These historical notes provoke both positive and negative reflec-
tions on Sugarman's proposals. On the supportive side, they remind 
us that tort law has been repeatedly charged with tragic deficiencies, 
and has been partially displaced by workers' compensation and no-
fault regimes. More significantly, the primary role of relieving the dis-
tress of injury victims has been taken over by sick leave, Social Secur-
ity, health insurance, and other programs that are unrelated to fault. 
If CCS were adopted, it would not deprive most injury victims of their 
meat and potatoes, but only of their fortune cookie. 
On the negative side, history reminds us that personal injury tort 
33. See Olson, The Liability Revolution, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LA w 1-3, 42-53 
~. Olson ed. 1988); Olson, Overdeterrence and the Problem of Comparative Risk, in id. at 42. 
34. For a tabulation of enactments in 1986 alone, see S. CARROLL, AssESSING EFFEcrs OF 
TORT REFORMS 47-72 (1987). For a survey of limitations on medical malpractice awards, see 
Smith, Battling a Receding Frontier: Constitutional Attacks on Medical Malpractice Laws, in 
PERSONAL INJURY DESKBOOK, 1986, at 226, 233-60 (B. Denkensohn & G. Ohlsson eds. 1986). 
35. THE SPECIAL COMMITfEE ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, TOWARDS A JURISPRU-
DENCE OF INJURY: THE CoNTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN 
AMERICAN TORT LAW (1984) (American Bar Assn. publication) [hereinafter ABA COMMIT-
TEE]. The committee observed that, "[i]f there is a central complaint, it is that the tort liability 
system 'costs too much,' " and explained that "[w]e take note of this criticism because of the 
frequency of its repetition." Id. at 2-31 (citation omitted). The conclusions of the committee 
rejected virtually all suggested modifications of the system. Id. at 13-1 through 13-21. 
36. REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POL-
ICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE AVAILABILITY AND AF-
FORDABILITY (1986) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP REPORT]; TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP, 
AN UPDATE ON THE LIABILITY CRISIS (1987) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP UPDATE]. These 
are paperback, typewriter-offset publications issued by the Government Printing Office that are 
not identified as the output of any standing agency. 
37. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 36, at 64-75. 
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law is a dietary staple that has survived every prior attempt to reduce 
it. 38 Although workers' compensation laws generally purport to sup-
press tort actions for worker injuries, claimants' attorneys have found 
means of maintaining tort suits against the remote employers of the 
victims' immediate employers and against the suppliers of equipment 
to employers. 39 Reformers' dreams of abolishing tort litigati6n seem 
about as likely to materialize as the abolition of armed conflict among 
nations. 
IV. ARE SUGARMAN'S PROPOSALS A SOLUTION? 
My reflections on Sugarman's proposals fall into two categories. 
The first I will call "optimality": If his proposals could be popularly 
accepted and legislatively adopted, would they advance human wel-
fare? The second I will call "acceptability": Could a majority of 
judges, lawyers, and jurors learn to view the system as beneficial and 
fair? I will apply these questions separately to the Comprehensive 
Compensation Strategy and to the Substantial First Step. 
1. The Comprehensive Compensation Strategy (CCS) 
a. ls it optimal? The central feature of CCS is its severance of the 
link between the source of compensation and the cause of the need 
being compensated. The fundamental question is whether this sever-
ance will help more than it will hurt the men, women, and children 
whom it will affect. 
In the tort system, compensation for an injury comes from or 
through persons who are associated in some way with the cause of the 
injury. The link persists even in automobile no-fault systems, where 
compensation depends on proving that automobile operation was a 
cause of the injury, although the operation need not have been faulty. 
The link between cause and compensation has potential values on 
both sides of the compensation process. On the victim's side, it creates 
an incentive to identify the causes of injuries in order to obtain com-
pensation. On the compensator's side, it provides motives to avoid 
accidents. When accidents have happened, the link provides incen-
tives to resist claims for compensation that are unjustified or exagger-
ated, although this benefit is partially, or perhaps wholly, offset by the 
incentive to resist meritorious claims, too. 
The incentive for accident avoidance is admittedly weak, touching 
individual tortfeasors lightly because they are usually covered by in-
surance or immune to money judgments. But it does motivate insur-
ance companies to raise premiums for accident-prone drivers, and 
leads employers to promote safety practices by their employees. 
38. See O'Connell & Barker, supra note 32, at 928-29; O'Connell & Guinivan, supra note 32. 
39. See 2 A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 71, 72 (1989). 
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Severing the link seems likely to have two kinds of costs, which 
may be massive, but which are hard to detect and control. 
i. Loss of safety incentives. Uncoupling compensation for injury 
from causes of injury seems likely to diminish safety incentives for the 
potential perpetrators of injury, and perhaps even for the potential 
victims.40 
On the perpetrators' side, the fear of suffering a huge liability be-
yond the coverage of insurance would vanish. True, individual perpe-
trators could lose their licenses, or even their jobs, and employers 
could suffer from increased Social Security taxes, or perhaps fines of 
the type levied on negligent nuclear energy generating companies. But 
the chances of incurring these penalties would depend on the zeal of 
governmental agencies, which would probably lack the prosecutorial 
incentives of plaintiffs' lawyers and which would be subject to commu-
nity pressures to go easy on the providers of employment and tax dol-
lars. The notorious failure of the U.S. Department of Energy to police 
nuclear pollution illustrates the danger of relying on government agen-
cies to promote safety without the goad of private action.41 
Under tort law, accident victims and their lawyers have a powerful 
incentive to put their fingers on perpetrators of injury because their 
compensation depends on identifying a culprit. When victims lose this 
incentive, safety-promoting agencies like the Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration and the National Highway Traffic Safety Ad-
ministration may never find out whom to punish. 
The possibility of a decline in reporting the causes of injury is sug-
gested by this reviewer's observations on property damage reporting 
under Michigan's no-fault law. The no-fault law, as originally en-
acted, abolished liability for damage done by automobiles to other 
automobiles, on the theory that car owners could insure themselves 
against damages to their own cars more efficiently than they could 
insure themselves against causing damage to others.42 Under this re-
gime, owners of damaged cars who formerly would have insisted on a 
40. See Trebilcock, Incentive Issues in the Design of ''No-Fault" Compensation Systems, 39 U. 
TORONTO L.J. 19 (1989); Trebilcock, supra note 1, at 992-93; R. GASKINS, ENVIRONMENTAL 
ACCIDENTS: PERSONAL INJURY AND PUBLIC REsPONSIBILITY 320 (1989). 
41. See Finamore, Regulating Hazardous and Mixed Wastes at Department of Energy Nu-
clear Weapons Facilities: Reversing Decades of Environmental Neglect, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 
83 (1985); Schneider, Nuclear Tests' Legacy of Anger: Workers See a Betrayal on Peril, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 14, 1989, at 1, col. 1; cf. s. SHAVELL, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 
283-84 (1987); Krier & Gillette, The Un-Easy Case for Technological Optimism, 84 MICH. L. 
REv. 405, 421-26 (1985). 
42. MICH. COMP. LAWS§ 500.3135(2) (1983), as originally enacted by 1972 Mich. Pub. Acts 
294. 
In 1979, the law was amended to permit tort suits for amounts up to $400 on account of 
unintentional damage done to cars not covered by the car owner's collision insurance. MICH. 
CoMP. LAWS § 500.3135(2)(d), (3), (4), (5), and (6) (1983), added by Act approved Nov. 13, 
1979, Pub. Act No. 145, 1979 Mich. Pub. Acts 849, 884-85, and Act approved Nov. 13, 1979, 
Pub. Act No. 147, 1979 Mich. Pub. Acts 896, 896-97. 
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police report in order to sustain a claim against another driver stopped 
reporting fender benders to the police. Where there was no personal 
injury, the police, even when present, sometimes let the parties decide 
whether they wanted a report made.43 
Uncoupling compensation from causation might also reduce the 
incentives for potential victims to avoid injury, or to minimize the con-
sequences of injuries that occur. Although human nature provides 
universal incentives to shy away from evident danger, it does not pre-
vent thousands of cyclists from riding without helmets, or millions of 
motorists from omitting to fasten their safety belts. A system that is 
explicitly indifferent to contributory fault might intensify the wide-
spread indifference to protecting oneself from tragedy. 
The persuasiveness of Sugarman's proposal rests finally on the 
reader's degree of confidence in the capacity of a government bureau 
to detect the causes of injuries and to assess penalties without the pres-
sures supplied by private claimants. In order to embrace his plan, one 
must believe that the costs of governmental safety administration plus 
the costs of an increase in accidents through the loss of deterrence 
would not exceed the costs of the tort system. 
ii. Risk of abuse. Although the title of Sugarman's book signals 
only his proposal to excise tort law from personal injuries, his Com-
prehensive Compensation System involves an expansion of the Social 
Security system that is equally revolutionary. Under the existing sys-
tem, beneficiaries have to show a need based on a specific cause, such 
as suffering a disabling injury, being laid off from work, or having de-
pendent children that keep the claimant at home. Under CCS there 
would be subsistence support for anyone who is not working. 
Sugarman probably assumes that there would be some means of 
determining that beneficiaries have a good reason, such as injury or 
lay-off, for not working, but he does not explain it. If there were no 
system, people could choose to live on the dole if they preferred not to 
work or preferred to work in the underground economy, where their 
incomes would not be visible to administrators of the system. The 
costs of supporting undeserving claimants would fall eventually on the 
general public through taxes. 
How effective the civil servants of this expanded social welfare net-
work would be in dealing with unjustified claims can only be guessed, 
subject to the biases of the guesser. Case workers in a welfare system 
seem likely to be more sensitive to demands of the needy claimants in 
their waiting rooms than to burdens imposed on distant taxpayers. 
43. Under the law as it stood from 1972 to 1979, owners of damaged cars sometimes wanted 
a report charging the other car's driver with a violation because their own collision policies 
compensated them more generously for accidents caused by the negligence of others than for 
unexplained accidents. Whether the 1979 amendment changed the attitudes of car owners or 
police to accident reports is unclear. 
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b. Can it win acceptance? In order to accomplish Sugarman's 
aims, CCS must be perceived by a wide sector of public and profes-
sional opinion as fair and just. The proposals would have to be favora-
bly perceived at the legislative stage in order to be adopted. They 
would need to enjoy enough acceptance after adoption to dissuade 
judges and jurors from evading or distorting their provisions or (in the 
case of judges) declaring them unconstitutional.44 
i. The abandonment of tortfeasor liability. Few ideas are dearer 
to lawmen and laymen than that wrongdoers should be ordered to pay 
for the wrongs they commit. The fact that tort law does not actually 
make tortfeasors pay, but rather shifts the costs through insurance to 
innocent bystanders, seems to have no effect on public attachment to 
the tort charade. The pretense of penalizing tortfeasors is perpetuated 
even by sophisticated academics, who talk as though tort law made 
tortfeasors pay for injuries. A Yale law dean and a Yale economics 
professor recently offered "four tests for liability in torts," all of which 
were phrased in terms of whether "the loss lies on the injured victim" 
or "the loss lies on the injurer."45 
Sugarman's abolition of the charade of tortfeasor liability (or the 
palliation of the charade in his proposed Substantial First Step) will 
not be acceptable until lawyers and voters learn to think of tort law 
not as allocating losses between injureds and injurers, but as allocating 
loss between injureds and a broad population of innocent consumers 
and taxpayers. 
ii. Indifference to the victims's deserts. Sugarman's proposals 
clash with intuitive justice also by excluding the contributory fault of 
victims from any effect on the benefits that they receive. Defenses 
based on contributory fault of the victim are to be completely abol-
ished in SFS as well as in CCS. Nothing is said about victims' aggra-
vation of their injuries by neglect, which is presumably irrelevant, too. 
The abolition of the contributory negligence defense is not surpris-
ing; it was banished long ago in workers' compensation systems. But 
most of these systems recognize a defense of "self-inflicted injury," 
and some recognize other fault-based defenses, such as "wilful 
misconduct."46 
It is easy to accept Sugarman's view that some level of subsistence 
and medical care should be provided regardless of the victim's own 
fault. To let the needy starve, even when they have precipitated their 
44. See Note, Legislative Limits on Medical Malpractice Claims: The Chances of Survival, 37 
MERCER L. REv. 1583 (1986); Note, The Constitutionality of Florida's Cap on Noneconomic 
Damages in the Tort Refonn and Insurance Act of 1986, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 157 (1987). 
45. Calabresi & Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEG. Sruo. 585, 587-91 
(1985); see also S. SHAVELL, supra note 41, at 1, 5. 
46. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 39, at 6-1 through 6-67. 
1570 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1557 
own needs, would be inhumane. It might also drive them into the 
underground economy, where they could live on crime. 
But humanitarians who favor the compensation of even the negli-
gent may still see some need for penalizing contributory fault. They 
may be reluctant to see· claimants recovering compensation for pain 
and suffering (which would be allowed under SFS) to which claimants 
have contributed by their own fault, or to see faulty claimants collect-
ing punitive damages (which Sugarman would allow even under CCS) 
from defendants who are no more faulty than themselves. 
m. The squeeze-out of private insurance. Sugarman's plan would 
have the effect of moving a good deal of benefit administration from 
the private insurance industry to an expanded public system of social 
welfare. This shift would be most marked in relation to work injuries, 
which are currently compensated by insurers for long periods of disa-
bility. In this respect, Sugarman's proposals differ from Keeton's and 
O'Connell's Basic Protection,47 under which insurance companies 
would simply shift their activities from paying on a fault basis to pay-
ing on a no-fault basis. 
This shift of activity would antagonize not only the private insur-
ance industry, but also a wider public who would see it as the nose of 
the socialist camel in the business tent. It might be opposed even by 
observers who are neutral between private and public enterprise, but 
who would think it wasteful to create new ·government facilities and 
staffs to perform functions that private insurance agencies are already 
performing. 
The acceptability of Sugarman's proposals therefore depends on 
the swing of public favor between public or private administration of 
benefit programs. 
iv. The squeeze on lawyers. The lawyers who would oppose CCS 
would include not only the specialists in personal injury law, but also 
most general practitioners, to whom the chance of sometime picking 
up a big personal injury case is their best hope for opulence. Although 
these lawyers lost a few battles over no-fault, they have subsequently 
organized and blocked any further expansion of that concept. 
There are, to be sure, lawyers who would see advantages to society 
or to corporate clients in cutting out damage suits, at least if the plan 
were modified to preserve the business of insurance companies. But 
these lawyers are far outnumbered by the general practitioners and the 
tort specialists. The recent report of an American Bar Association 
committee, 48 which supported the preservation of personal injury tort 
law without even the limits suggested by the Attorney General's 
47. R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNELL, supra note 2. 
48. ABA CoMMITTEE, supra note 35. 
May 1990] Personal Injury Torts 1571 
Working Group,49 is a good indication of the position of the organized 
bar. 
In the 1970s, no-fault advocates prevailed over the bar in some 
states by winning the support of a consumer movement that was more 
militant then than it is today, of a sector of the insurance industry, and 
of both labor and management in the automobile industry. But the 
subsequent mobilization of the bar, which stalled no-fault in the 1980s, 
seems likely to block Sugarman's proposals in the 1990s. 
2. The Substantial First Step (SFS) 
Since Sugarman's Substantial First Step proposes a less complete 
revolution than his Comprehensive Compensation Strategy, it appears 
to have some advantage over CCS in acceptability. 
Unlike CCS, SFS would preserve substantial private incentives for 
safety practices. The tort actions that survive would keep individuals 
and enterprises aware of the liability threat. These actions would also 
provide a demonstration of society's condemnation of risk-enhancing 
behavior. 
By preserving a role for insurance companies and lawyers, SFS 
would weaken the appeal of these groups to public opinion. Although 
voters are not prepared to dispense with attorneys and private under-
writers, they are quite ready to believe that lawyers and insurance 
companies are getting "too much." The authorization of attorneys' 
fees would palliate the indignation of the organized bar and dull vot-
ers' receptivity to lawyers' complaints. 
The "collateral sources" that would dispense a good deal of the 
compensation under SFS are less afflicted with structural weakness 
than Sugarman's expanded social welfare system would be. The ad-
ministrators of disability insurance, for example, have a professional 
interest in controlling the costs of their program which might not exist 
among administrators of a universal welfare system like the · one 
Sugarman proposes. 
There is a fair chance that SFS might overcome the inertia that 
stalled adoption of no-fault automobile proposals in the past decade by 
offering reductions in liability to a wider circle of defendants. These 
reductions might be partially offset by the proposed increases in health 
insurance, sick leave, and disability benefits, but the public (other than 
successful damage claimants) would probably gain because most of the 
collateral source compensation is already being paid. The savings 
would come from reducing duplication. 
v. How Do WE GET THERE? 
If Sugarman's plans could be made to work as designed, they 
49. WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 36. 
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would create a society that would not only be kinder and gentler to the 
unfortunate, but would also free the income of the fortunate from the 
drain of costly litigation. Although the attainability of these goals is 
problematic, they seem worth the risks of social experimentation. 
Any such experimentation would, however, face formidable oppo-
sition. Sugarman does not tell us how this opposition is to be over-
come. He tenders none of the rousers like O'Connell's Blame Game so 
and Lawsuit Lottery 51 to inspire activists. He does not even present 
tables or charts to make his points more visual. 
Readers who are intrigued by Sugarman's goals will probably be 
asking themselves how society could be moved closer to the end-zone. 
I offer here some of the thoughts that have crossed my mind as I 
pondered this problem. 
I. Denouncing Double-Dipping 
One of tort law's most vulnerable vices is the principle that is 
known to lawyers as the "collateral source rule," but is little known by 
any name to anyone else. It is the rule that lets injury victims collect 
damages for lost wages and medical expenses even when those ex-
penses have already been compensated, or will be compensated, by 
other sources such as workers' compensation, group health insurance, 
and OASDI. 
A powerful coalition could be organized to attack the rule. But 
first, the rule would have to be given a name more easily grasped by 
the public, like "double-dipping." Motorists, whose voting power was 
demonstrated in the recent California referendum on insurance pre-
mium reductions, 52 could be promised a substantial reduction in pre-
miums if damages were reduced by collateral sources. Merchants and 
manufacturers would gain by a lowering of judgments for product 
liability. 
Defendants' gain would not be confined to the arithmetical advan-
tage of subtracting collateral benefits from the jury's estimate of gross 
loss. In many cases, defendants would gain also by reducing the jury's 
estimate of gross loss, because jurors would no longer visualize injured 
claimants as destitute paupers; they would see them rather as suitors 
who are no worse off than the jurors themselves, but are grasping for 
an extra slice of the welfare pie. 
so. J. O'CoNNELL & C.B. KELLY, supra note 30. 
51. J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LoTIERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN (1979). 
52. See Cal. Ins. Code § 1861.01 (West Supp. 1989) (containing the language of Proposition 
103, approved Nov. 8, 1988); see also Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 771 P.2d 
1247, 258 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1989); Stevenson, California Court Delays Cuts by Voters in Insurance 
Rates, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1988, at 1, col. Al. 
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2. Revealing Who Pays and How Much 
Trials, appeals, political debates, and even academic discussions53 
of injury compensation are conducted in front of a looking glass that 
reflects only the needs of the claimant and conceals the people behind 
the mirror who will pay the bill. No evidence and no argument is 
admitted about whose pockets will be tapped for the millions of dollars 
that the jury may assess against the nominal defendant, 54 nor about 
the disparity between what is paid by the contributors and what is 
received by beneficiaries. 
In economic fact, most damage awards are shifted through various 
mechanisms, and eventually borne by the innocent public, much like 
taxes. 55 Damages assessed against individual motorists are shifted via 
insurance to large classes of automobile owners, differentiated by fac-
tors such as their neighborhoods of residence and drivers' ages. Dam-
ages assessed against manufacturers and merchants are shifted to 
consumers via higher prices, or to the taxpaying public by way of de-
ductions from the taxable incomes of manufacturers and merchants. 
Moreover, the amount that the public pays is approximately twice 
what the injury victims receive because of the costs of investigation, 
litigation, and insurance administration. 56 
From a welfare perspective, the merits of paying a million dollars 
to an accident victini, whether viewed in terms of intuitive justice or 
economic optimality, depends on who ultimately pays, and how 
much. 57 If juries are to make just decisions about shifting wealth, they 
53. See, e.g., S. SHAVELL, supra note 41, at 1, 5; Calabresi & Klevorick, supra note 45. 
54. For the general rule on the inadmissibility of evidence of either defendants' or plaintiffs' 
insurance, see 2 J. WEINSTEIN, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1! 411[01] (1989); cf. Arnold v. Eastern 
Airlines, 712 F.2d 899 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984) (reversing a judgment 
because of counsel's oral argument on defendant corporation's wealth) (content of the argument 
described in Arnold v. Eastern Airlines, 681 F.2d 186, 196 (4th Cir. 1982)). 
For the impropriety of arguing that awards are reflected in insurance premiums, see Finney v. 
G.C. Murphy, 400 Pa. 46, 49-50, 161 A.2d 385, 387 (citing defense counsel's argument on this 
subject as an alternate ground for reversal). Cf. Hoover v. Gregory, 253 N.C. 452, 117 S.E.2d 
395 (1960) (holding that no harm was, done by judge's instructing ju_ry to disregard effect of 
verdict on insurance premiums). 
55. See P. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 3-5 
(1988). 
56. For a compilation and analysis of data from various surveys, see J. KAKALIK & N. PACE, 
supra note 5, at x-xiv, 66-76. 
57. On the intuitive level, there seems to be no welfare gain in requiring individuals with 
incomes of $20,000 to compensate losses suffered by individuals with incomes of $40,000, unless 
the losses of the latter reduce them to the level of the former. Even among individuals with equal 
incomes, there is no obvious gain in requiring the uninjured members to contribute a total of 
$2000 to compensate an injured member for a $1000 loss, which would enrich the injured mem-
ber less than it would impoverish the contributors, in the aggregate. 
On the plane of economic optimality, the case for compensation through a system that costs 
twice as much as it delivers is even more problematic. The total wealth of the injureds and the 
injurers is reduced when ~e latter pay $2000 in order to give the former $1000. The system 
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should know from whom, as well as to whom, they are shifting it, and 
the approximate ratio of benefits to burdens. 
A possible tactic for promoting recognition of who really pays for 
personal injury compensation would be to admit in injury trials evi-
dence and argument about who ultimately pays the bill and about the 
ratio between costs and benefits. Although insurers have traditionally 
opposed disclosing the fact of a defendant's insurance, they might find 
it advantageous if they could also disclose who pays in the end, and 
how much. Admitting this kind of evidence would prolong and com-
plicate trials, but it is as relevant to a just solution as evidence on a 
claimant's anatomy, physiology, and prospective future earnings. 
A proposal to admit these considerations in lawsuits would require 
a long campaign of public education, but the campaign itself would 
serve to educate voters and jurors on the realities of who pays what for 
injury compensation. 
3. Punishing the Perpetrators 
If the charade of assessing big damage awards against tortfeasors is 
abolished by the adoption of Sugarman's proposals, the importance of 
imposing real penalties for real fault should be intensified. Rather 
than putting a cap on punitive damages, as Sugarman proposes, puni-
tive damages should be made truly punitive by assessing them against 
individuals, rather than corporations, and by forbidding anyone to in-
sure or indemnify defendants against punitive liability. In order to 
restrain juries from assessing millions of dollars to express the depth of 
their indignation, they should be told that the damages are uninsur-
able and that defendants will have to pay punitive damages from their 
own pockets. This device would preserve the law's function in con-
demning wrongdoing while reducing the temptation for jurors to play 
Robin Hood by awarding "punitive" damages that will not cost a 
penny to the individuals who erred. 
Claimants who have contributed to their own misfortunes could 
also be penalized without impoverishing them by diminishing their 
claims for punitive damages or for compensation for pain and suffer-
ing. Preserving the role of contributory fault in awards of these kinds 
would honor the law's functions of relating awards to deserts, and of 
demonstrating society's disapproval of risky practices of victims as 
well as of tortfeasors. 
appears to be optimal only in cases where the loss of the injured, if uncompensated, will be 
multiplied by continued disability, unless one regards benefits to lawyers as a social objective. 
Cf Priest, Understanding the Liability Crisis, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LIABILITY LAW 196, 
210-11 (W. Olson ed. 1988) ("In effect, the system forces those with low incomes to subsidize the 
insurance costs of those with high incomes."). See also observations of S. SHA VELL, supra note 
41, at 266, on "socially undesirable claims." 
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4. Conserving the Services of the Insurance Industry 
Sugarman's plan could be modestly revised to keep insurance com-
panies in the business of handling a volume of benefits similar to what 
they now handle under workers' compensation and health insurance. 
The primary merit of this step is its economy. It would avoid the 
expense of creating a new pool of personnel, office buildings, and com-
puters to replace an existing pool of people and facilities. 
On the political level, this amendment would disarm the skeptics 
who doubt that governmental agencies can operate as efficiently as pri-
vate ones, and might mollify the powerful insurance industry. 
5. Promoting Class Suits for Safety 
Although Sugarman's plans are oriented toward welfare, they will 
fail to attract the support of safety advocates if they rely exclusively on 
the diligence of government bureaus to suppress dangerous activities. 
When individual claims have lost their sting, the law should authorize 
class suits for injunctive relief on behalf of potential injury victims, like 
miners, hospital patients, or automobile travelers (against trucks), in 
which attorneys fees' would be assessed against enterprises that disre-
gard safety measures. 
' This device would provide a second line of defense against risks 
that government officials may ignore, like the poisoning of the environ-
ment around military defense facilities. 58 
6. Justifying the Lawyer Squeeze-out 
One of the toughest tasks in selling the Sugarman agenda will be 
persuading the public to dispense with the lawsuits that they have 
learned to regard as the prime instrument for compensating the inno-
cent and punishing the guilty. The argument that lawsuits have a high 
expense ratio is unpersuasive to voters because they do not perceive 
that they are the ones who pay the bill. 
In order to make an effective appeal for a compensation system 
that bypasses lawyers, voters would have to be persuaded that they 
would save a lot on liability insurance that would not be offset by addi-
tions to their social welfare taxes. They would need to be shown that a 
big share of compensation can be dispensed more quickly and more 
cheaply in no-fault systems than through tort law. 
In order to make an effective appeal on the basis of cost reduction, 
a viable CCS should not expand the classes of social welfare benefi-
ciaries very far beyond those that now qualify under the cause-con-
58. See Finamore, supra note 41, at 87 Qisting areas of potential government mismanage-
ment); Schneider, supra note 41 (detailing radiation exposure to workers at weapons testing 
ground). For an analysis of the risk-reducing incentives of private suits, see Gillette & Krier, 
Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 139 U. PA. L. R.Ev. (forthcoming 1990). 
1576 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 88:1557 
nected programs such as those for the aged, the disabled, the laid-off, 
and parents of dependent children. The humanitarian goal of helping 
the neglected needy will not win as many votes as savings on insurance 
premiums. The broadening of the social security net may be a desira-
ble objective, but hitching it to the attack on tort law is likely to defeat 
both objectives. 
CONCLUSION 
During the 1990s, scholars and legislators will confront a passel of 
proposals to "reform" personal injury law. The flood of tort law mod-
ifications, which reached every state in the 1980s, gives proof of a tide 
of dissatisfaction that has not reached its apogee. 
Most of the reform proposals will tinker with specific problems, 
like collateral sources in medical malpractice cases, or the magnitude 
of awards for pain and suffering, or the levels of insurance premiums. 
If adopted, these proposals will complicate the crazy-quilt of tort law 
without relieving the problems of delay, expense, undercompensation, 
and overcompensation. 
In contrast with these patchwork repairs, Sugarman has offered a 
bold, well-articulated plan for extricating society by stages from the 
injustices and the waste of personal injury compensation under tort 
law. His work challenges scholars and legislators to replace atomistic 
revisions with a comprehensive and consistent plan for compensating 
needs of many kinds, while preserving incentives to avoid the creation 
of needs. Reformers and anti-reformers of the 1990s should be pre-
pared to justify their projects as steps toward some goal as comprehen-
sive and as fair as Sugarman's. 
